Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Natural Law Forum

1-1-1958

A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel
Lon L. Fuller

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Fuller, Lon L., "A Rejoinder to Professor Nagel" (1958). Natural Law Forum. Paper 30.
http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/nd_naturallaw_forum/30

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Natural Law Forum by an authorized
administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

A

REJOINDER

TO

PROFESSOR NAGEL
Lon L. Fuller

I HEARD that Professor Nagel would comment on my paper at the
1956 meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association I looked forward with real anticipation to learning his views on
the central problem of my essay. I have never been content either with my
own way of presenting that problem or with my somewhat groping attempts
to answer it. Phrases like "a merger of fact and value" are unsatisfactory
and serve not so much to extend knowledge as to acknowledge and chart its
limits. I had hoped that a logician of Professor Nagel's acumen would either
sharpen my phrasing of the problem or identify some fault in my analysis
responsible for creating the appearance of a problem where none in fact
existed.
So far as I can see, neither of these things happened; and by the time I
reached the end of Professor Nagel's comments every hope I had entertained
for a profitable exchange had been shattered. To be sure, Professor Nagel
begins on a tentative note and with an expression of apologetic doubt whether
he has truly understood my meaning. But as he proceeds, these uncertainties
disappear; and before he is through, I am presented as someone intent on
"fuzzing" the most obvious truths, presumably in the interest of some unclean social doctrine. Indeed, I am made to "break a lance" for the most
extraordinary views: that the whole of human history is a single process
which may be described as the unfolding of one purpose shared by all mankind; that if the judges of former centuries could revisit the earth they
would recognize that our courts are merely bringing to more successful
articulation what they had been trying to say centuries before, etc. When
one is confronted by misinterpretations of this magnitude, it is hard to know
where to begin in trying to re-establish effective communication. I shall,
however, do my best.
WHEN

The Meaning of "Natural Law"
In the first paragraph of my essay I recognized the difficulties which
arise from the fact that the term "natural law" has many meanings. My
object was to concentrate on one crucial issue which seems generally to be
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implicated whenever men speak of the opposition of the schools of "natural
law" and "positivism." I considered it unwise to complicate that issue by
attempting to pass judgment en route on the views of the differing schools
of thought which may be brought under the common rubric of "natural
law."
This invitation to narrow the scope of the inquiry was declined by Professor Nagel. He assumes that there is some single body of beliefs called "the
natural law doctrine" which may safely be left undefined, and that he is in
a position to assert that this undefined doctrine "supplies neither a tenable
nor a useful basis for evaluating existing law." He also feels justified in asserting that this "doctrine" is one that I do not find "uncongenial."
To avoid further misunderstanding I should like to record here that I do
not accept any "doctrine of natural law" which asserts one or more of the
following propositions: 1) the notion that the demands of natural law can
be the subject of an authoritative pronouncement; 2) the notion that there
is something called "the natural law" capable of concrete application like a
written code; 3) the notion that there is a "higher law" transcending the
concerns of this life against which human enactments must be measured and
declared invalid in case of conflict. I do not know whether Professor Nagel
regards as a perversion of language any theory that calls itself "natural law"
and at the same time makes the exclusions I have just outlined. If he does,
I can only plead in defense that this particular perversion is at least as
ancient as Aristotle, in whom I find no trace of the elements I reject.
On the affirmative side, I discern, and share, one central aim common
to all the schools of natural law, that of discovering those principles of social
order which will enable men to attain a satisfactory life in common. It is an
acceptance of the possibility of "discovery" in the moral realm that seems
to me to distinguish all the theories of natural law from opposing views. In
varying measure, it is assumed in all theories of natural law that the process
of moral discovery is a social one, and that there is something akin to a
"collaborative articulation of shared purposes" by which men come to understand better their own. ends and to discern more clearly the means for
achieving them.
Apparently this notion of a "collaborative articulation of shared purposes"
is to Professor Nagel the sheerest nonsense, with the qualification that "individuals and groups" do at times "engage in a collaborative process by which
common goals are established and articulated." The meaning of this concession, and the reason it is restricted as it is, are unclear to me. The explanation nearest at hand is that Professor Nagel believes that collaboration
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of the type I have envisaged is possible only within a group where some uniformity of moral values has already been impressed on its members by a
common social environment. If this is the meaning intended, it remains
puzzling why collaborative discussion could clarify or improve a culturally
conditioned uniformity; a man scarcely turns to his fellows for assistance
in discerning what the forces of his environment compel him to do; one
hardly needs help in responding to inevitability. I am inclined to believe that
even with respect to the small group Professor Nagel means something different by his articulation of common goals than I do when I speak of an articulation of shared purposes. He apparently believes that even within the
small group it is absurd to think that a pooling of insight and experience
could assist the members of the group to understand more truly their own
ends. This interpretation seems to be supported by the fact that Professor
Nagel couples the "articulation" of common goals with their "establishment."
Apparently he has in mind that "common goals," that is, goals already understood and shared, may be "articulated" by being brought unchanged to adequate verbal expression, and may then be "established," that is, given some
formal sanction as a part of the rules governing the activities of the group.
Beyond this he seems unwilling to concede any function to collective intellectual effort.
At this point I encounter what is to me the most puzzling aspect of the
philosophy implied in Professor Nagel's comments. On the one hand, he
seems to reject as intellectual folly any collaborative quest for a better understanding of the proper ends of a society. At the same time, he castigates "the
doctrine of natural law" for pretending to be the only theory that attempts
to formulate "objective standards for the moral evaluation of the law."
This claim he counters by asserting that the natural law doctrine is only one
of many ethical theories professing to offer "objective standards" of moral
evaluation. One wishes at this point he had identified at least one of these
rival theories and had explained how it is that a standard can be "objective"
and yet not be capable of improvement by common intellectual effort.
One can understand the reluctance of a scholar to force within the
compass of a short article a discussion of subtle and complex theories. On
this ground one may excuse Professor Nagel's failure to specify and describe
any ethical theory that does not profess "the natural law doctrine" and yet
yields "objective standards for the moral evaluation of the law." This excuse
could have been claimed with better grace, however, had the same scholarly
restraint been applied to the discussion of natural law, where Professor Nagel
seems quite content to deal and judge in terms of verbal slogans.
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Perhaps it is unfair to suggest that Professor Nagel has applied a double
standard of scholarly restraint in dealing with his friends and his foes. He
obviously considers that my article demanded a counterattack and he may
therefore rightly claim the license accorded the polemicist. If this be conceded, it still remains true that his failure to take a clear position with respect
to any ethical theory other than that of natural law makes it difficult to discern the vantage point from which he dispatches his critical shafts. In a
concluding section of this reply I shall indicate the sort of ethical theory
that seems to be implied in Professor Nagel's statement of his position. Meanwhile, it is first necessary to clarify the crucial issue that separates us.
Toward a Delimitation of the Issues
One argument made by Professor Nagel seems to me to be quite unresponsive to any issue raised by my article. This is his declaration that what
I am asserting "is at best a tautology," and amounts to saying that there is
an element of evaluation in any inquiry which seeks to determine how effectively a purposive system (such as a machine or a human being) is accomplishing its objective. I must say that however groping and unsatisfactory
my discussion may be, I do not think I was foolish enough to advance as an
important truth the proposition that evaluation equals evaluation.
I have never denied that there are two postures of the mind toward
reality that can be called "descriptive" and "evaluative." The question I
proposed for discussion was whether an attempt at description can succeed
in eliminating evaluative elements when it is addressed toward the functioning of a purposive system. It was precisely because I wished to raise this
question without running the risk of falling into a tautology that I chose my
illustration of the boy with the clam, where descriptive and evaluative efforts
cannot at the outset be considered as being carried on simultaneously because
we do not at first know what the boy is trying to do.
Another false issue seems to me to be raised by those passages in Professor Nagel's article in which he appears to say that I am, in effect,
counselling snap judgments, that if my views were taken seriously the physician would feel free to prescribe remedies without diagnosing his patient's
condition, the judge to sentence the accused without hearing the evidence,
etc. I see nothing in my position suggesting any disparagement of careful
observation, painstaking analysis, patient reflection, or the fair treatment of
defendants. Professor Nagel's assumption to the contrary simply reflects his
belief that none of these desiderata will be achieved unless we are prepared
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to accept his views concerning the nature of the evaluative process. This
simply brings us back to the central issue of the whole debate.
Still another general point is made which, it seems to me, in no way
advances our discussion. This consists in asserting that my "premises are not
obviously relevant for grounding my conclusions." By this I take it Professor
Nagel means to suggest that even if I were correct in what I have to say about
the relation of "is" and "ought," I would still have established nothing
"obviously relevant" to the assertions made, and the questions raised, in the
latter part of my article. Certainly I can understand why Professor Nagel
is unable to discern any clear line of thought connecting the various portions
of my article. Essentially he seems to regard the questions I raise concerning
the relation of "is" and "ought" as nonsensical. If I myself were to encounter an ethical theory which took as its starting point the question whether
all garks are savigrous I, like Professor Nagel, would have difficulty in seeing
what either an affirmative or negative answer to that question would entail.
It is Professor Nagel's deep conviction that the question I am raising is
nonsensical which is responsible, I believe, for the truly colossal failure of
communication which has taken place between us. The fact that he approaches my whole article with that conviction has made it impossible for
him to approach sympathetically the notions I was trying to expound in the
last part of my article, though I regret to say it has not prevented him from
passing some sweeping negative judgments about views which he seems
obviously not to have understood. If there is any hope for understanding,
it must lie in a clarification of the basic issue raised by my article.
A Restatement of the Issues Raised in my Article
As I see it, two closely related issues are raised by the exchange between
Professor Nagel and myself:
(1) Is it always possible to give an adequate non-evaluative account of
any object that is itself the subject of an evaluation?
(2) If so, does evaluation become legitimate (or "competent") only
when its object is first identified by such a non-evaluative account?
If I understand him correctly Professor Nagel gives an affirmative answer
to both of these questions. While the assumption that an affirmative answer
is the proper one runs through his whole article, so far as I can see Professor
Nagel devotes only five sentences to what seems to be an argument for his
position. These five sentences are as follows:
I shall first try to show that Professor Fuller's illustration presupposes
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the distinction between fact and value. According to him, when we once
grasp the purpose which actuates a boy's manipulation of a clam, we
discover in the structure of events as they unroll "an element of value";
and we can anticipate whether a certain action will be continued or not,
because the action is regarded as good or as bad as a means for achieving
the boy's objective. But just how does the example show that fact and
value merge? In characterizing one of the boy's actions as "bad," it is
surely pertinent to ask what it is we are so characterizing; and the answer
must inevitably be descriptive of a fact. Indeed, unless a careful factual
account can be given, one that is not colored by surreptitious value imputation, we cannot judge competently whether the act does have the
value attributed to it.1
If there is any "tautology" in our exchange, I submit it lies in these
sentences. If it were true, as Professor Nagel assumes, that we can always
give two distinct accounts of any course of purposive action, each adequate
within its own realm, the one descriptive, the other evaluative, then it would
certainly follow that the evaluative account would constitute a judgment or
a series of judgments about the object of the descriptive account. The question is whether this separation of the two kinds of accounts is always possible
or profitable, and whether accuracy of description is always promoted by
eliminating evaluative judgments.
In my illustration of the boy and the clam I had supposed that even if
we were interested in the "pure fact" of the occurrences there relatedsay, in the directions and dimensions of the boy's physical movements-we
could envisage that "pure fact" more accurately if we knew what the boy
was trying to do. The effect of a disclosure of the boy's purpose in bringing
about a sudden enlargement of perspective was to be explained in part, I
had assumed, because we were now in a-position to participate vicariously
in a process of evaluation; that is, we could now understand (and thus
describe more accurately even in purely physical terms) what happened
when the boy moved from one activity to another. These suppositions still
seem to me to be completely justified, and I find no reason advanced by
Professor Nagel for abandoning them.
In understanding the point of my illustration it should be noted that it
does not relate to a single action, but to a course of conduct extending
through time, in which transitions from one act to another are determined
by judgments as to what is apt and what is not for the accomplishment of
the boy's purpose. In this connection I should like to recall a passage in my
1.

Supra, 79.
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article, the thought of which seems to me to be largely ignored in Professor
Nagel's criticism:
[W]hen we are dealing with purposive action projected through
time, the structure that we observe, recall, and report lies, not in any instantaneous state of affairs, but in a course of happening, which can be
understood only if we participate in a process of evaluation by which the
2
bad is rejected and the good retained.
The insistence that there must always be something that can be described
in non-evaluative terms before evaluation itself can be justified reminds one
of the controversy about empirical verification that arose out of the movement called logical positivism. Logical positivism started with the proposition
that it is only those sentences which can be "empirically verified" that are
meaningful, that is, proper subjects for intelligent discussion and argument.
As it gradually became clear what complexities inhere in the notion of
empirical verification, particularly as applied to "a sentence," the adherents
of logical positivism found it necessary to retreat from their original position.
A convenient cover for this retreat was found in the notion of verification
"in principle." It having been discovered that it was impossible in practice
to give a meaningful account of what would be involved in actually verifying
a sentence empirically, the original proposition was modified to read: "Only
those sentences are meaningful that are in principle subject to empirical
verification." So in a similar manner we now find it being asserted that "in
principle" evaluation never becomes justified until we have described accurately in non-evaluative terms the thing we are evaluating.
How far this insistence can be carried is illustrated in the comments of
another critic. In a book discussed by this writer I had remarked that if we
were confronted by a dubious assemblage of mechanical parts and were to
ask of it, "Is it a steam engine?" and, "Is it a good steam engine?" these
two questions would "overlap mightily. ' 3 My critic responded that this is
not necessarily so at all and indicated that the whole difficulty could be removed by a little definitional ingenuity. He suggested that by stipulation we
might define a steam engine in non-evaluative terms, as requiring certain
parts, arranged in a certain relationship to one another. 4 Of course, an attempt at such a definition might be made, but what earthly purpose could
2.

Supra, 70.

3.

THE LAw IN QUEST OF ITSELF 11-12 (1940).

4.

Samuel Mermin, The Study of Jurisprudence-A Letter to a Hostile Student, 49

MICHIGAN LAw REVIEw 39, 65 (1950).
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it serve unless it be to support "in principle" a philosophic position taken in
advance and now confronted by an embarrassing example? Parenthetically,
it can be confidently predicted that the attempt at a "non-evaluative" definition of a steam engine would inevitably miss its mark; ambiguities would
always be latent in the definition which would have to be resolved in favor
of that meaning most apt in describing a machine fit to serve the general
purpose of a steam engine. Professor Nagel's position seems to be essentially
that of the critic just discussed. He too supports the rigid separation "in
principle" of "is" and "ought," though he cautiously refrains from informing
us how he himself would describe in non-evaluative terms those physical
actions which he would categorize as "good" or "bad" attempts to open
a clam.
In seeking to keep the discussion of the relation of "fact" and "value"
on a level where misunderstanding is least likely, I have emphasized in my
writings situations involving physical movements and artifacts like chairs and
steam engines. This is the arena of discussion most uncongenial to the tentative conclusions I have attempted to convey, for here what I have to say
runs counter to the tacit assumptions of language itself. It is on this elementary level that unreflective common sense is most inclined to embrace
the fallacies of what may be called the pointer theory of meaning.
If we move the discussion to the realm of legal and moral ideas, the
whole controversy assumes a different aspect. Here the picture of a kind of
evaluative finger pointing itself toward "things" loses even the specious appeal
it has in more elementary contexts. During the oral discussion of my paper
I attempted unsuccessfully to induce Professor Nagel to state how he would
deal with problems of the following sort: Let us suppose a rule of the common law. Though this rule is treated by lawyers, judges, and legal scholars
as if it were a single, existent thing, it never receives quite the same verbal
formulation in any two statements of it. In such a situation evaluation may
be comparatively easy. To those who have given serious thought to the
problems involved, it may be possible to range the various formulations of
"the rule" roughly on a scale of adequacy; in any event it is easy to recognize gross ineptitudes. But what shall we say of "existence"? What "is"
the thing, or what "are" the things, lawyers have in mind when they agree
in saying, "This is a poor formulation of the rule"? In neither case can the
"thing" be mere words on paper, for the same words will provoke different
responses in different readers. A perceptive reader may pass over almost
unnoticed an inadequacy in formulation, since his mind seizes at once the
thought toward which the author was groping unsuccessfully. The mind of
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a less perceptive reader may waver in indecision among various obscure and
unsatisfactory meanings. The same uncertainty of response even more obviously makes impossible a definition of "the rule" in terms of patterns of
human behavior. I have asked, and I ask again: In this sort of context how
do we apply the dogma that before we can evaluate we must first define
clearly in non-evaluative terms the thing it is we are evaluating?
The fundamental article of the positivist faith is that "law" either exists
or does not and that no evaluation is involved in reaching a judgment about
its existence. I have tried to show the difficulty in maintaining this belief
when we apply it to "law" in the sense of a "rule of law." But suppose the
question to be, not that of the existence of a particular rule of law, but of a
legal order. Here again the view of positivism is that a legal system can be
thoroughly "bad" from top to bottom by any number of standards and yet
be a regime of law. But by what process of judgment do we decide whether
something "is" a legal order?
I suppose that no one would discern a "legal order" in any of the following imaginary situations: 1) verbal directives called laws are issued by
something that calls itself a government, but there is no discernible correspondence whatever between the acts of those who purport to enforce the
law and the rules they purport to enforce; 2) verbal directives called laws
are issued, but they are all kept secret or are published in a cipher known
only to the legislator; 3) verbal directives called laws are issued, but they
are all retrospective in effect and no prospective laws are ever enacted. In
all of these situations there is so gross a departure from the ideal of a legal
order, even of an order devoted to evil ends, that nothing exists in any of
them we would be tempted to call "law." Yet the ideal of a legal order is
never attained perfectly. In all legal systems there is some discrepancy between formal rules and governmental actions taken pursuant to them. Everywhere we encounter the problem of poorly drafted rules and rules that are
conveyed inadequately to those who are affected by them. Probably all

governments have from time to time undertaken to cure past irregularities
by retroactive statutes.
If what I have just said is correct, it follows that the "existence" of a
legal order is always a matter of degree and cannot be measured in "nonevaluative" terms. How, then, in determining whether a legal order "exists"
do we distinguish between the "existent thing" and its "value"? Or is the
doctrine of a strict separation of "is" and "ought" to be rescued once more
"in principle"? Will the answer be that there must always exist in a given
society some particular complex of words, attitudes, and actions before I can

NATURAL LAW FORUM
say of it, "This falls short of the ideal of a legal order"? What utility is
there in this insistence if in fact the only significant thing I can say about
this social complex is that it does fall short of the ideal of a legal order?
Surely it would be absurd to assert that I must colligate in "neutral" terms
every existent thing embraced by such a judgment before the judgment itself
can be "competent." To do so would be like saying that unless we can trace
the precise trajectory of a marksman's bullet we have no right to assert
that it missed the target. Surely we can say that a legal system is missing
its target without having to report the precise angle of divergence of every
human action that contributes to that missing. We can also say of something that calls itself a legal order that it is missing that target so woefully
that it cannot in any meaningful sense be termed a system of law. It has,
if you will, so little "value" that it has ceased to "exist."
Until Professor Nagel, or someone sharing his views and possessing his
logical acumen, is prepared to take a position with reference to questions of
the sort I have just posed, there seems no escape from the conclusion that
for the time being professional philosophers of his school of thought are more
concerned with supporting a theory taken in abstraction from the law than
they are with lending a hand in solving the problems of legal philosophy.
Fact and Value in the Administration of the Law
In his brief reference to courts of law, Professor Nagel appears to assume
that the administration of the law presents no special difficulties for his view.
Indeed he seems to believe that it is especially obvious in the law that evaluation cannot be competent unless it is directed toward an object first identified
in non-evaluative terms. I believe, on the contrary, that an open-minded
examination of legal problems will reveal how impossible it is to maintain in
any actual process of human decision a rigid separation of fact and value of
the kind recommended by Professor Nagel.
The great advantage of the study of legal materials lies in the fact that
the law cannot be content to maintain a distinction "in principle"; if it
accepts a distinction as sound, it is compelled to find some way of giving
effective expression to it in the actual decision of controversies. If it is believed that a witness must report what he saw in completely non-evaluative
terms, then the judge must decide what questions may properly be addressed
to him and what forms his responses may take. Let me illustrate the difference
between problems as they arise in the administration of the law and as they
are likely to be conceived in philosophic discourse.
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Two philosophers are debating about "value" and "fact." One of them
says, "It is not true that evaluation only becomes possible if its object can
be identified in non-evaluative terms. For example, I can say of a dancer,
'He is trying to tango, but is not succeeding.' I can say this even though it
would be impossible for me to describe what he is in fact doing." His
opponent, quite undisturbed by this example, may reply, "Ah, but there
must always exist some pattern of motions to which your value judgment
that his attempt to tango is unsuccessful can apply; otherwise it would be
meaningless. The more accurately this pattern is described, the more competent will be the value judgment passed on it." There the matter has to rest.
Suppose, however, that a dancing couple is employed by a night club on
the basis of an assurance that they can do all the standard ballroom steps.
On their first appearance a tango is played, and they are discharged for
being unable to tango. They bring suit for improper discharge. In support
of its case the company operating the night club wishes to put on the stand
various patrons who were present during the disputed dance. The judge
must now decide what form their testimony may take. Will they be required
to describe the dance performed in terms of physical motions, leaving it to
the jury to determine whether the dance so described is an adequate tango?
Or will they be permitted (subject to cross examination on their competence)
to say something like, "Whatever they were doing, it was not a tango"?
The philosopher may be inclined to distrust the alleged lessons of legal
experience. He may consider that the judicial process is surrounded by an
air of exigence not conducive to clarity of analysis, or that the law to get its
job done has to make compromises that would not be tolerated in philosophic
discussion. I do not think the possible contribution of the law to philosophic
theory can be dismissed so casually. After all, the most relevant peculiarity
of the law lies in its responsibility to reach and explain decisions. It seems
to me that modern epistemology is coming more and more to recognize that
there is an element of responsible decision in all intellectual activities, including those of science. 5 One philosopher suggests that the present "age of
analysis" is giving way to an "age of decision." ' 6 Surely if this is true the
decisional science called law should offer something of interest to the
epistemologist.
I have already tried to show that in legal reasoning generally no such
distinction as that insisted on by Professor Nagel is or can be made. Consider,
for example, the rules which state under what circumstances the various
(1951).

5.

MICHAEL POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY

6.

MORTON GABRIEL WHITE, TOWARD REUNION

IN

PHILOSOPHY

(1956).
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forms of legal responsibility arise. Most of these rules will turn on fault or
negligence. A enters into an oral agreement with B: he thinks he said one
thing; B interpreted him to mean something else. In general the principle
is that there is no contract if both were at fault in the misunderstanding or
if both were without blame. If, however, one was negligent while the other
was not, the court will enforce the contract in accordance with the understanding of the prudent party. The term "negligence" is plainly a term of
evaluation, but there is generally in the law no "non-evaluative" colligation
of the things or instances to which this term should be applied. The ways
of missing the target are countless and unpredictable; they can only be given
a meaningful classification under the rubric "misses."
Again, though it is said to be the function of a jury to determine "facts,"
when a jury is asked to bring in a special verdict, the question addressed to
it will almost invariably be one soliciting what in philosophic discussions
would be regarded as an evaluation: "Was the defendant proceeding with
due care?" "Was the apartment in suitable condition for occupancy?"
Generally speaking it is only with respect to the testimony of witnesses
that it becomes possible even to consider maintaining a distinction between
evaluating and identifying the object of the evaluation in "neutral" or
"factual" terms. There is in this field an interesting experiment directed
toward giving effective legal sanction to the desideratum urged so strongly
by Professor Nagel. This is the Opinion Rule as developed in this country,
though not followed in England or on the Continent. In general terms this
rule states that an ordinary witness who has observed some event may testify
only to what he heard and saw; he may not give "opinions."
Under this rule a witness who observed an accident when an automobile
skidded on glare ice may not tell the jury that the defendant was going "too
fast"; he must instead attempt to estimate the speed of the car in miles per
hour and leave it to the jury to say whether operating a car at that speed
under the conditions then obtaining was an act of negligence. Again, a witness may not describe a fence along a railroad right of way as being "not in
a fit condition to turn cattle," but must attempt some more "factual" account
of its condition, from which the jury may decide whether a fence so described was "fit" to turn cattle.
There have always been exceptions to this rule. Curiously, one of the
most firmly established is that relating to testimony concerning economic
value. Under this exception a plaintiff is permitted to testify, for example,
to the value of services rendered as a part-time housekeeper or to the value
of a used desk lost in shipment. Other exceptions permit the witness to say
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that a person "looked angry," or "acted insane," or "seemed to be sick."
Perhaps statements of the last-mentioned variety might be dismissed from
the present discussion on the ground that, although they may be called
"opinions," they are not evaluative. I suggest, however, that the difficulty
in knowing just what kinds of testimony should be regarded as "evaluative"
is something that should be pondered before Professor Nagel's view is accepted
as a general guide in the actual solution of legal problems of proof.
With all its exceptions and qualifications, the Opinion Rule has been
7
condemned, I believe, by every careful student of the law of evidence. The
reason for this condemnation does not lie in the notion that the jury ought
to have the benefit of the witness's opinion or "value judgment." It is rather
that in many situations it is simply impossible for the witness to communicate
to the jury the fact of what he saw in non-evaluative terms; he can feel more
assured of his own honesty if he says "the car was going too fast when it
skidded," than if he is compelled to give an estimate of its speed in miles per
hour. Of course, the conclusion that a statement of value, "too fast," may
be the most effective way of communicating a situation of fact to the jury
presupposes some community of purpose and some common human nature
shared by the witness and the jury. Some may regard this as a fatal objection
to it. But those concerned with the actual administration of the law have to
accept this supposition if it seems to have reality in the discourse of man
with man.
Ends Out of View and the Collaborative
Articulation of Shared Purposes
We now reach that portion of my article where, in Professor Nagel's
opinion, absurdity reaches its acme and where he confesses he finds my
views "incredible."
With respect to the "end out of view," Professor Nagel's demonstration
of the absurdity of my remarks is somewhat facilitated by a misquotation in
which I am made to speak of the "end-in-view" being "out of view." While
I certainly said nothing like that, the idea I attempted to convey was that in
7. 7 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§1917-1929 (3d ed., 1940). MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
19-28 (1954); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OasEVIDENCE, Rule 401 (1942).
The virtual abolition of the rule as it existed in the American common law in Rule 401
of the CODE is thus explained, p. 201: "Where a witness is attempting to communicate
the impressions made upon his senses by what he has perceived, any attempt to distinguish
between so-called fact and opinion is likely to result in profitless quibbling. Analytically
no such distinction is possible."
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disposing of controversies and issuing directives we may operate within a
framework of purposes which conditions our decisions even though only
certain of these purposes are called into consciousness by the facts of the case
at hand. Although I had thought of this as being an almost obvious truth
of psychology, it is for Professor Nagel a "myth."
All I can assert in response is that I am unable to attribute any clear
meaning to Professor Nagel's discussion of this point. What he seems to
say- which I in turn find "incredible"- is that our actions and words can
never be directed or conditioned by any end or assumption not actively
present in consciousness. If this were so, I could not go into the library and
come back absorbed in reading a book unless I had formed the conscious
purpose of returning to my office. I am puzzled by Professor Nagel's failure
to touch even tangentially on the illustration I borrowed from Wittgenstein.
I say to another person, "Show these children a game." The possibility that
this might be taken to mean they should be taught to throw dice does not
enter my mind. Had the addressee of my remarks been a notorious gambler,
I might well have added, "but not your kind of game." In the actual context
of my remark, however, there was as little reason to give conscious attention
to that possibility as there is for me to ask myself as I get out of bed in the
morning whether the floor will be still there to receive me. In his illustration
Wittgenstein asks whether I can truthfully say, "I did not mean that kind of
game," only if I had consciously considered the throwing of dice and had
consciously excluded it. I can see no justification for Professor Nagel's casual
dismissal of this problem with such epithets as "myth" and "product of
dubious reasoning."
Closely associated with the notion of "the end out of view" was my discussion of the "collaborative articulation of shared purposes." Here again
Professor Nagel seems to me to say nothing to which I can respond except
by trying to convey more adequately the point I attempted to make in the
first place.
Let me this time give an illustration in the form of a series of imaginary
judicial decisions. Of necessity, my presentation will be schematic, and I
shall have to leave it to the reader familiar with the growth of the common
law to say whether I have truthfully portrayed any aspect of the judicial
process. The cases that follow are given in the order of their assumed
chronology. The parties in each case are different persons, but to facilitate
comparisons the symbols used to designate the parties will be the same
throughout and will indicate the role played by the particular party; thus
in all five cases 0 will designate the original owner of the horse which came
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by theft or fraud into the hands of T.
Case No. 1. T steals O's horse and sells it to G, who pays full value for
it and had no reason to know it had been stolen from 0. 0 brings suit against
G to recover the horse. Held, for 0. One of the deterrents to thievery is the
difficulty of disposing of stolen goods. If a purchaser like G were able to
take free of the claim of the true owner, a market for stolen goods would be
created and, thus, an incentive to theft. In any event, it was impossible for T,
a thief who had no rightful title to the horse, to pass any title to G; he who
has nothing can give nothing.
Case No. 2. T buys a horse from 0 giving as payment a forged note purporting to be that of X. T knew that the note was forged. After delivering
the horse to T, 0 discovers that he has been defrauded. He brings suit
against T to recover the horse. It is argued on behalf of T that 0 delivered
the horse to him with the intent to confer title; the horse is now T's, and O's
only remedy is to sue for the price. Held, for 0. The passage of title was
vitiated by the fraud of T; title throughout remained in 0.
Case No. 3. The case is similar to Case No. 2, except that after receiving
possession of the horse, T sold it to G, who knew that T had bought it from
0, but had no reason to know that T had worked any fraud on 0. 0 brings
suit against G to recover the horse. It is argued on behalf of 0 that title remained in him in accordance with the principle laid down in Case No. 2.
Since T had no title, he could pass none to G. Held, for G. It would be an
intolerable burden on commerce if purchasers of property were compelled to
scrutinize the details of a transaction by which the former owner voluntarily
delivered it into the hands of the person now offering it for sale. Fraud takes
many and subtle forms; if the victim could not recognize it, it is unreasonable
to ask of a stranger to the transaction that he ascertain whether it was present.
With respect to Case No. 2, all that was said there was with reference to the
legal relations between the owner and the defrauder; the court's mind was
not directed toward the possibility that a subsequent purchaser, like G,
might intervene. The principle we are here applying is that if the horse is
in the hands of T, or of someone who knew of his fraud, it may be recovered
by 0. In the hands of an innocent purchaser like G, the horse may not be
recovered by 0, for reasons we have already indicated.
Case No. 4. The case is like Case No. 3, except that after buying the
horse from T, G sold it to K, who, before he bought the horse from G, had
been informed of the fraud worked by T on 0. 0 sues K to recover the horse.
It is argued on behalf of 0 that K was not an innocent purchaser, since he
knew of T's fraud when he bought the horse. In accordance with the prin-

NATURAL LAW FORUM

ciple laid down in Case No. 3, 0 became entitled to the horse when it came
into the hands of K. Held, for K. If the argument made by 0 were accepted, it would be possible for a person in the position of 0 to destroy the
value of the title acquired by G simply by giving general publicity to the fact
that T had induced the sale by fraud. Thus the objective of protecting the
bona fide purchaser G would be defeated, for his property would become
unsaleable. When the court in Case No. 3 said that 0 could recover the
horse from anyone who knew of the fraud of T, it did not have in mind the
possibility that the horse might have passed previously through the hands of
a bona fide purchaser like G. When the horse was bought from T by G, title
to it was perfected and was no longer vulnerable to attack by 0. G was then
free to sell it to anyone he saw fit.
At this point I urge the reader to stop and consider whether we are now
at the end of this development, and whether there is any new situation likely
to arise which will require a reformulation of the principles laid down in
Case No. 4. When he has assured himself on that point, he may proceed to
Case No. 5. This case is like Case No. 4, except that K not only knew of
T's fraud, but had participated in it by forging X's name on the note used by
T to pay 0 for the horse. 0 sues K to recover the horse. K rests his defense
on the reasoning of Case No. 4; G had title to the horse and was free to sell
it to anyone he saw fit. If K was guilty of any misconduct, that is a question
for the criminal law; it ought not to affect his property rights. Held? . . .
Perhaps the point of my illustration will be most effectively conveyed if at
this point I leave to the reader, not only the burden of decision, but the more
onerous burden of explanation.
To me it does not seem absurd to claim that the series of cases I have
reported reveals something that might be called "the collaborative articulation of shared purposes." If this expression seems too pretentious, I would be
content to say that these cases show that communication among men, and a
consideration by them of different situations of fact, can enable them to see
more truly what they were all trying to do from the beginning. In answer
to Professor Nagel's contention that nothing like this can happen except in a
tightly knit group, I suggest that, without losing their point at all, the five
cases I have reported might each be separated by a half century from its
predecessor, and that the courts which decided them might be those of five
different nations. To be sure, the legal development I have suggested would
be unintelligible to a human being who knew nothing of property, or of sale,
or of contract. But what is the use of a search through time and space for
this creature, unless it be to discredit any attempt to discover and articulate
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those principles which will promote a satisfactory life in common for the
human beings we know and understand, and by whom we can in turn be
understood?
I hope it will be clear to the reader, as apparently it was not to Professor
Nagel, that I am not foolish enough to suppose that the whole essence of
legal history is compacted in the phrase, "the collaborative articulation of
shared purposes." The history of the common law reveals many things, including instances of wooden literalness and even of corruption. All I am
asserting is that the development indicated in my series of imaginary cases is
one important aspect of legal history. How important it will be in the future
depends upon whether it is Professor Nagel's philosophy of adjudication that
is accepted or that which I have attempted to express here.
Before leaving the question of the efficacy of collective endeavor in defining moral and legal ends, I should like to raise for brief consideration the
problem of the utility of hypothetical or imaginary cases. Throughout the
centuries it has been thought that such cases may be useful in legal and moral
discussions. It has been believed that sounder decisions will be reached when
a wide range of such cases has been taken into account. I should like to ask
how such cases fit into Professor Nagel's views of the decisional process. To
be sure, we can expect him to say that they are admissible whenever their
facts can be defined in non-evaluative terms. But the question is not whether
they are admissible, but why are they useful? Am I again falling into an
absurdity if I suggest they are useful because they facilitate a process I have
called the collaborative articulation of shared purposes?
What is at Stake?
I have already indicated the difficulties that confront me in responding
to Professor Nagel's contention that even if my premises were correct they
would not justify my conclusions. Since from nonsense nothing followsnot even more nonsense- it is a little hard to know what one can say at
this point in self-defense.
I can only affirm my conviction that the differences between him and
me are of fundamental importance. At the present time the prevailing philosophy of ethics seems to me to have descended to a level of triviality that is
truly appalling. It is my belief that this decline has been due to a general
acceptance of the thesis espoused by Professor Nagel.
Perhaps I can best convey my view of the present state of ethical theory
by saying it calls to mind a picture something like this. A human being, A,
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is engaged in doing some act, such as giving money to a beggar, or paying a
gambling debt, or dragging the unconscious victim of an automobile accident
to the side of the road. An observer, 0, points to A's action and is heard to
say, "This is good." At this signal ethical theoreticians begin swarming in
from all sides. Their first act is to relieve the scene of the encumbrance of A,
who is ousted without ceremony. This done, all gather round 0 and embark
on a lively disputation in which everyone talks at once. How shall we characterize that sentence 0 just uttered, "This is good"? What is its "semiotic
status"? Is it a mere ejaculation equally meaningful and equally meaningless, whether emitted in private or in public? Is it, in other words, like the
"um-um" of a man enjoying a pot roast? Or is it perhaps a kind of news
report to others about O's inner state? Is it such a report coupled with an
invitation to others that they join in this inner state? Or instead of being
*viewed as a mere invitation, shall O's remark be interpreted as demanding or
claiming that others should or must share his approving glow? Is 0 announcing an invitation or a directive that others do what A was just observed
to do? At this point someone is heard to shout, "You are wrong, 0. What
A did was bad, not good." 0 starts to defend himself, but before he can
complete a sentence the theorists swarm round him again and begin debating
the kinds of demonstrations or assertions that 0 may properly employ in
supporting his position. Can he only say, "Well, I feel that way"? Or can
he adduce something that can be called "proof," "validation," "justification,"
or "explanation" for his position? What is the quintessential difference between proving a fact and demonstrating that a value judgment is right?
So the debate moves in endless circles. If the reader thinks there is
exaggeration in my figurative account, I suggest that he consult the literal,
sober, and useful report made in the 1957 issue of the FORUM by Professor
Nakhnikian.8 If ethical theory is ever to escape from the wordy muddle in
which it is now bogged down, I suggest that the first step will have to be to
bring A back on the scene. If we consult with him we shall learn that his
act was not an isolated event, but a response to a problem or an opportunity,
and that this response was that of a whole man, or of a man trying, feebly
or forcefully, to become or to remain whole. Before we can pass judgment
on A's response we shall have to inquire whether A had adequately defined
the situation - that is, the problem or the opportunity - that presented itself to him. We shall have to inquire whether there were other responses
available to A that would have been more apt. We shall have also to ask
8.

George Nakhnikian, Contemporary Ethical Theories and Jurisprudence, 2
FORUM 4 (1957).
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whether A gave enough thought to defining the situation and to selecting
his own response, or whether, perhaps, he wasted his time in giving more
thought to these problems than the situation properly demanded. As we ask
these questions it will become increasingly apparent that we are no longer
concerned with an isolated action, but with a process of living and deciding.
If in this transition we lose the existent datum toward which 0 pointed an
approving finger, we shall in compensation regain contact with questions
that are real in the lives of human beings.
The poverty of the results produced by so many empirical studies of
human attitudes and preferences seems also to be traceable to a methodology
deriving essentially from the position taken by Professor Nagel. No one
would deny, I suppose, that human attitudes and preferences characteristically change with time. It is also clear, I believe, that if the organization and
proper orientation of the attitudes and preferences under study is a problem,
not only for the individuals being studied, but also for the observer, the
observer will be unable to predict the future course of these attitudes and
preferences. One who knows the answer to a puzzle can often predict
roughly the steps another will follow in solving it; if the observer is ignorant
of the answer, he can only participate vicariously in the process of solution.
In this participation the "clear" distinction between what is observed and its
appraisal disappears. Where human attitudes and preferences are of real
interest they generally relate to problems of life that are problems equally
for the observer and for the observed. The consequence is that if the social
scientist studying attitudes and preferences is to secure anything that can be
called a reportable "datum," he must take toward his subject a point of
view that effects a cross section through time, producing a kind of instantaneous snapshot arresting all motion and development. This operation does
violence to the nature of the thing under observation, so that its essential
reality is lost. When an attempt -is made to restore at least a part of that
reality, it consists in taking a series of snapshots, spaced through time and
revealing a "trend." If this "trend" conveys any significant meaning, it is
generally because in interpreting it we surreptitiously reintroduce the process
of vicarious evaluation that was ruled out by Professor Nagel's maxim at the
outset. The result is that after a study conducted by the method I have
described, our understanding of the subject matter often seems to have been
impoverished rather than enriched.
No one would dream of following any such self-defeating procedure if
the inquiry fell within the area, say, of technology. Suppose, for example,
we wanted to ascertain the "preferences" of construction engineers in solving
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some problems of their specialty. It would be apparent at once that we
would have to take into account knowledge, experience, and insight. Plainly
a statement of preference coming from a wise and experienced engineer is
not only more valuable than, but something different in fact from, that of
a younger and less experienced one. The older man might very well state
more accurately than the younger what the latter's preference would actually
be if he were forced to deal with the problem in question. The younger man
may report his own preference inaccurately because he is unable to discern
the demands of the situation until it becomes something he must face in real
life; the older man's insight and understanding can dispense with this crutch
of direct confrontation.
So soon, however, as we touch on anything that seems to smack of
"values," all of this common sense falls into the discard, and the quest for
the elusive "neutral" datum is resumed with almost religious fervor. Yet is
it not plain that insight and understanding can play a role in ethical judgments as well as in those of engineering? When we encounter differences of
opinion among lawyers about what are in fact the ethical standards of their
profession, do not these differences often reflect variations in insight and
experience, rather than different opinions as to what actually "exists"? It
is true of course that before we can weigh insight and experience into the
balance we must ourselves participate in the process of judgment going on
in the minds of our respondents. When this happens some fuzz may develop
around the distinction between fact and value, but I do not think this too
high a price to pay for recovering meaningful contact with reality.
These are brief and inadequate observations about what seem to me to
be the things at stake in the debate between Professor Nagel and myself.
I should like to make it clear that my fundamental objection to his position
is that it is intellectually untenable. I do believe that a general and literal
acceptance of the theory would entail disastrous consequences for law and
morality. But these consequences would result from the falsity of the theory,
not from the fact that it was consciously aimed at producing them.
Is the Purpose of Law and Morality the
Resolution of Social Conflict?
As one studies his remarks it is not easy to discern clearly Professor
Nagel's own legal and moral philosophy; the negations of his article so outweigh the affirmations, both in number and explicitness, that it takes some
searching to find any of the latter at all. I believe, however, that there are
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two passages which reveal a positive theory of morality, and presumably also
of law. Essentially this is the theory that the basic and perhaps exclusive
object of morality is to resolve human conflicts. On page 78, "judgments
asserting what ought to be are conceived [by Professor Nagel] as hypotheses
about ways of resolving conflicting needs and interests." Again, on page 81,
he asserts that "there are competing and even incompatible human objectives,
both individual and social, and that the task of moral theory is to provide
standards with the help of which such conflicts may in some measure be
adjusted."
As applied to the law this is a conception closely associated with the
position of legal positivism. There are traces of it in most writers belonging
to that school, though as usual it is Kelsen who brings the view to most
explicit statement:
Justice is an irrational ideal. . . . Regarded from the point of view of
rational cognition, there are only interests, and hence conflicts of interests.
They can be solved by an order that either satisfies one interest at the
expense of the other, or seeks to establish a compromise between the two.9
The notion that the purpose of law is simply to settle disputes is almost
a clich6 of legal thinking, though I think a dangerous one. When one extends
the same view to morality, as Professor Nagel apparently does, it certainly
loses any platitudinous quality it might previously have had, and becomes a
novel and even startling conception of the role played by moral rules in
human life.
It is not difficult, I think, to show the inadequacy of any theory which
treats law and morals as being exclusively concerned with the resolution of
conflict. In the first place, any such theory must default before the question,
What conflicts require resolution? Some conflicts between individuals and
groups are beneficial, some are harmful. 10 How shall we discriminate between the two? The second major default of the suggested theory is in
answering the question, How shall we resolve particular conflicts? If the
resolution of conflicts is to be a rational process it must in time develop
principles, and those principles will inevitably enter into and shape the lives
of men for good or ill. How then are we to articulate those principles by
9. The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARVARD LAW REVIEW
44, 48-49 (1941).
10. Sociology, which in recent years has tended to take absence of conflict as its only
criterion of social health, is becoming concerned with the possible valucs of conflict. See
LEWIS COSER, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (1956).
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which conflicts and disputes are to be decided? If the answer is that we
should choose those principles which give the greatest assurance that conflict
will not recur, we are simply brought back full circle to the theory's first
default.
If the theory is as unacceptable as I have just indicated, why is it even
suggested that the purpose of law and morality is exhausted in the resolution
of conflict? An easy answer would be to say that this view is required if
the principle of a sharp distinction between fact and value is to preserve
even a minimum plausibility; the recognition that law and morality have
more affirmative tasks would make it clear as daylight that the "existence"
of both of them consists in a striving which we can understand only in terms
of ends that are never fully attained.
I believe, however, it would be unfair to suggest that Professor Nagel
adopts the theory of law and morality he does only because this theory enables
him to maintain his principal position. Rather I think the explanation lies
in a moral conviction of the value of diversity and variety in human life
and in the directions of human striving. This is a view I ardently share.
I have attempted elsewhere to show, however, that though the moral goals
of legal positivism are worthy, it serves these goals badly and indeed endangers the very ideals it so properly holds to be precious. 1 ' I refer the
reader to that discussion as a supplement to what I have been able to say
here. I believe it will be found to offer a sympathetic account of the essential aims of positivism- or at least as sympathetic an account as is possible when it is assumed that one's opponents in argument do not truly
understand their own motivation. But in conclusion I want to repeat that
my objection to Professor Nagel's view does not rest on any conjectural
motivation that may lie behind it, but on the ground that it seems to me to
falsify the relation between human beings and the reality by which they are
compelled to orient their lives.*

11.

Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart's Essay, 71

REviEw 630, 669-672 (1958).
* Professor Nagel has indicated
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his intention to continue this discussion in the 1959
number of the FORuM. He plans to consider also Professor Witherspoon's comment, "The
Relation of Philosophy to Jurisprudence," which appears in the "Notes" section of this
number at 105-134.-Ed.

